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I. Introduction 
 
This paper presents an estimation of the total deposits held by Andorra’s banking 
system between 1931 and 2007. Throughout the twentieth century, Andorra rose to 
become one of the leading offshore banking clusters in southern Europe. Today, 
banking is one of the most dynamic activities in Andorra’s economy. Its relative share 
of GDP is in the region of 20 per cent. Historically, the country has been characterized 
by the absence of a central bank, the free movement of currency, banking secrecy and 
no taxes on savings income prior to 2005. In that year, the ratio of deposits to GDP was 
285 per cent. In Spain, one of the countries with the highest banking coverage in 
Europe, this ratio did not exceed 91 per cent (Ruiz 2007, p. 126). In 2007 the total 
wealth under management in Andorra was 10 times greater than GDP.  
Nonetheless, literature on the evolution of Andorra’s banks remains scarce due 
to the sector’s poor regulation and its secrecy. Previous studies have stressed the 
centrality of banking to the Andorra economy and its role in channelling savings into 
the international market (Sogues 1975; Arasanz 1986; Lluelles 1991; Garcia 2001; 
Gurdó 2006; Sáez 2004; Cabana 2005). However, research has not provided a 
comprehensive long-term view of the sector and in some cases offers no quantitative 
measures of its evolution.   
 The aim of this study is to analyse the lifecycle of Andorra’s banking industry. 
The paper also shows the contribution made by specific firms to the creation of the 
sector’s competitive advantage. The major new source of information offered here is 
Crèdit Andorrà’s annual reports from 1957 to 1983, which stand as a significant 
addition to the available data. Use is also made of documents from the National Archive 
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of Andorra (hereafter NAA) and the Archives of the General Council of Andorra 
(hereafter AGCA) to analyse legislative developments in the sector (Annex 1).1  
 
II. Evolution of Bank Deposits as a Lifecycle Measure 
 
Andorra’s Department of Statistics started publishing banking data in 1989. For 
previous periods, the available references are scattered and piecemeal. Examples in 
print include published interviews with banking professionals and texts collected within 
commemorative books. Sogues (1975) presents client liabilities for Andorra’s banking 
sector for the period 1970-1973 based on sector information. Gurdó (2002) gathers data 
on the Mora Bank Group (Banc Internacional d’Andorra and Banca Mora, or BIBM) 
from a book celebrating the firm’s fiftieth anniversary. Cabana (2005) contributes data 
on Banc Agrícol i Comercial d’Andorra and Banca Reig for the period 1931-2001 
drawn from the commemorative book published on the occasion of the two firms’ 
merger.  
 This paper provides for the first time an aggregate estimate of total deposits held 
by Andorra’s banks in the period 1931-2007. In addition to bringing together this 
scattered data, the paper also includes information from Crèdit Andorrà’s annual reports 
for the period 1957-1983. Bearing in mind that between 1989 and 2007, a period for 
which we have complete information, Crèdit Andorrà’s market share hovered in the 
region of 35 per cent, the inclusion of this earlier data is crucial for understanding the 
evolution of Andorra’s banking sector. The estimate draws on the data of a total of six 
firms. Because it has not been possible to obtain data for the Andorran subsidiary of 
Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona, active in the country between 1934 and 2007, 
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its volume of deposits is not included. Even so, it is known that its funds had risen to 
39.68 million pesetas by the end of 1959 (Nadal and Sudrià 1981, p.380). 
 To calculate the estimate, it is assumed that banks, in any years without 
available data, achieved a growth in deposits equivalent to the average growth of all 
firms included in the calculation of the aggregate. This may not be the most reasonable 
criterion at an individual level, but it does provide valuable information on the general 
trend in the sector. In addition, most banks were set up as foreign exchange businesses. 
As no assurances can be given that they accepted deposits, the assumption is made that 
banks began to receive deposits in the year that they obtained their license. To adjust the 
data set for inflation, the estimation uses the Spanish consumer price index put forward 
by Carreras and Tafunell (2004). 
 
Figure 1 
Estimation of Andorra’s bank deposits 1931-2007 (in 1950 pesetas) 
 
Source: Own preparation. 
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 Historically, Andorra has not had its own currency.2 Throughout the twentieth 
century, the French franc and the Spanish peseta were both used in the country, 
although the peseta was more widespread. The budgets of the General Council were 
prepared in pesetas, most salaries were paid in pesetas and bank deposit data were 
reported in pesetas.     
 
 
Table 1 
Real cumulative annual growth of bank deposits in Andorra for 1931-2007  
(in percentages) 
 
Period PTA 1950 FF 1950* 
1931-1947 24.9 25.6 
1947-1957 9.8 -2.6 
1957-1982 21.4 29.5 
1982-2007 3.3 7.6 !
Source: Own preparation. 
* Adjusted for inflation using Sédillot’s French consumer price index (1979) and data from the World 
Bank. 
 
Adjusting the data in the two currencies for inflation provides evidence of 
similar trends in the evolution of deposits. In figure 1, four stages can be identified in 
the lifecycle of the cluster.3 Between 1931 and 1947 deposits grew at a rapid, but erratic 
pace. Between 1947 and 1957, the pace of new deposits slackened significantly 
compared to the previous period. From 1957 until 1982, the sector saw a sustained 
period of hypergrowth. Lastly, from 1982 to the end of the data set, the growth in 
deposits lost steam and became more modest, experiencing alternating positive and 
negative growth rates. 
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Table 2 
Percentage of deposits in Andorra by bank, 1957-2007 
 
 
 
Source: Own preparation. 
 
  
 By estimating deposits, it is possible to analyse the role played by the various 
banks in the configuration of the cluster. On the whole, scholars of industrial 
organization draw the conclusion that the geographical concentration of companies in 
districts or clusters fosters the appearance of competitive advantages. However, they 
hold opposing views regarding company size in the creation of competitive advantage. 
Proponents of small-scale business take inspiration from the development of neo-
Marshallian districts in the so-called Terza Italia, or Third Italy. They stress that a large 
number of small firms makes the Marshallian district highly dynamic and flexible, 
better able to adapt to demand and to manage the use of the workforce. They argue that 
the drawbacks of a small scale are outweighed by the value of cooperation when 
creating business networks and purchasing inputs jointly (Becattini 1979, Brusco 1982, 
Sforzi 2009). On the other side, some authors see a source of competitive advantage in 
the capabilities of large companies (Chandler 1987, Landes 1988, Markusen 1996). 
They underscore that the successes of the US and Germany during the Second Industrial 
Revolution exploited economies of scale generated by clusters in which large businesses 
were predominant. Along the same lines, tertiary clusters such as the high-tech industry 
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in Silicon Valley or the film industry in Hollywood are led by large businesses. 
Together with economies of scale, it seems clear that strategy, organizational learning, 
management capability and process improvement make the large company a major 
source of internal economies.  
 In the case of Andorran banking, the estimation of deposits points to a clear 
hierarchy among the firms in the cluster (Table 2). Between 1957, the year in which the 
opening of new firms was prohibited, and 2007, the two banks with the greatest market 
share accounted for over 60 per cent of deposits. The advantages stemming from 
banking concentration in Andorra were reinforced by the existence of large firms that 
acted as leaders in contributing to the improved business capabilities of the cluster. 
 
III. Origins of the Cluster, 1930-47 
 
In 1930, Andorra ended the licensing policy that had been in force since the mid-
nineteenth century. 4  During this period, the country had sought to modernize a 
predominantly rural economic structure by granting licenses for gaming, thermal 
springs and postal services. With the advent of the twentieth century, concessions for 
the exploitation of natural resources were proposed. After a score of failed projects, the 
co-princes pushed forward a hydroelectric power station (Lluelles 2004, p. 35). The 
concession, which was granted to a Spanish-French investment group instigated by the 
Catalan industrialists Damià Mateu Bisa and Miquel Mateu Pla, also brought with it 
exclusive banking rights and, in return, stipulated the construction of the country’s road 
network.5 On 5 March 1930, the group set up Forces Hidroelèctriques d’Andorra S.A 
(hereafter FHASA). The electricity generated by the plant went to the industrial area of 
Barcelona and permitted the electrification of Andorra.     
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 On 30 December, nine months after the creation of FHASA, the first bank in 
Andorra was founded: the Banc Agrícol i Comercial d’Andorra. The bank’s charter 
stipulated that the firm would remain exempt from any tax burden and that any other 
banks set up in the country would attract a 5 per cent tax rate on their operations to be 
divided in half between the General Council and the concessionary bank. 6  Not 
possessing its own currency, Andorra could not control or limit currency circulation. 
The lack of institutional regulation led de facto to the establishment of banking secrecy. 
 Banc Agrícol launched operations in July 1931. The entirety of its start-up 
capital was Catalan in origin. Investors included the Mateus, who held a majority stake; 
Joan Fornesa and Bonaventura Rebés, who were the owners, respectively, of Banca 
Fornesa and the branch of Banca Arnús in La Seu d’Urgell; and Lluís Desvalls Trias, 
the Marquis d’Alfarràs, who was associated with La Caixa d’Estalvis i Mont de la Pietat 
de Barcelona (Cabana 2005, p. 37). In 1934, the strong relationship between the Mateus 
and Francesc Moragas, chairman of La Caixa de Pensions de Barcelona, led Banc 
Agrícol to authorize the opening of one branch of the La Caixa de Pensions de 
Barcelona, limited to savings accounts.7  
The outbreak of the Spanish civil war in 1936 initiated a critical period for the 
Andorran economy that lasted until the end of World War II. The conflicts hindered the 
country’s supplies. Shortages and rising inflation led to price controls and the regulation 
of foreign trade. In 1936 and 1937, the scarcity of coinage led the General Council to 
issue pesetas backed by the Spanish central bank (Turró 2007, p. 53). Smuggling rose 
sharply. Andorra, as a country bordering both France and Spain, benefited economically 
from its geographical location, introducing all kinds of products to its two neighbours, 
particularly tobacco, hides, wool and automotive parts (Lluelles 1991, p. 253). 
Andorra’s neutrality also made it a safe haven for currencies. The demand of refugees 
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from the Spanish civil war for French francs fuelled currency exchange in the country. 
World War II, the high post-war inflation of the franc and the appearance of parallel 
market rates for the peseta and the franc also appear to have played a role in the influx 
of capital into Andorra.8 The evolution of deposits makes it possible to approximate the 
monetary impact of the Spanish and global conflicts. Although the data are not 
continuous in these early years, deposits grew between 1931 and 1947 at a real 
cumulative annual rate of 24.9 per cent. To that end, the General Council passed laws 
against speculation so as to prevent harm to the domestic economy. Foreigners were 
prohibited from any unauthorized purchase or sale of currency and all payments were 
required to be made in pesetas.9 Despite the constraints, however, the prospects offered 
by foreign exchange encouraged some Andorrans to take up the currency business. In 
the nineteen-thirties and forties, at least six cases can be identified.  
 
Table 3 
Origins of Andorra’s Banking Cluster 
 
Foreign exchange firms Year set up 
Banc Agrícol i Comercial d’Andorra 1930 
Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona 1934 
Josep Cassany 1937c 
Lluís Aymat 1937c 
Jane Huillier 1937c 
Josep Josa 1937c 
Bonaventura Riberaygua Argelich 1937c 
Le Comptoir Andorran de Change 1938 
 
Source: Own preparation. 
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In 1937 Lluís Aymat d’Encamp, Jane Huillier and Josep Josa d’Escaldes were 
running a currency exchange firm. 10  Josep Cassany, founder of Banca Cassany, 
remarked in his memoirs that he, too, was engaged in currency exchange during the 
Spanish civil war (Cassany 1999, p. 10). Bonaventura Riberaygua Argelich, secretary of 
the General Council between 1935 and 1950, drew on his experience in foreign 
exchange during the war as support in his application to set up Crèdit Andorrà.11 In 
1938 Bonaventura Mora Munt established Le Comptoir Andorran de Change, a foreign 
exchange office that maintained banking correspondence with Tangier through the 
Societé de Banque Suisse (Gurdó 2002, p. 15).  
The Spanish civil war and World War II were a historic shock for Andorra’s 
economy. The country acted as a safe haven for currencies amid surrounding monetary 
instability. With the end of the conflicts, the country’s introduction into global trade and 
the regulation of goods moving through France and Spain enabled the country to benefit 
from international imports arriving from two directions. This reflected the post-war 
complementarity of needs in Andorra’s two neighbouring markets which, together with 
the absence of excise taxes, helped to give rise to a powerful trade and tourism sector 
aimed at French and Spanish consumers (Bricall et al. 1975, Lluelles 1991, 2004, 
Comàs d’Argemir 2002, Galabert 2012). The growth in funds deposited in Andorra’s 
banks and the existence of moneychangers shows how the country’s neutrality acted as 
an initial perturbation for the emergence of a cluster based on the competitive advantage 
arising from the free movement of currencies. 
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IV. Growth in Critical Mass, 1947-57 
 
The end of the Spanish civil war and World War II halted the influx of refugee capital 
into Andorra. European currency restrictions forced the country’s banking sector to 
operate primarily with Swiss banks. The general shareholders’ meeting of Banc Agrícol 
on 18 June 1949 expressed the difficulty of conducting operations with France and 
Spain due to foreign exchange controls. In order to maintain a ‘good neighbour’ policy, 
large amounts of currency were not accepted even though currency exchange operations 
were the bank’s most profitable business. In 1948, the cancellation of a French 
correspondent’s current account, which represented half of the bank’s deposits, shows 
how difficult it was to operate with Andorra’s neighbours (Cabana 2005, p. 58-59).  
In the previous year, Miquel Mateu had put half of his shares up for sale. He had 
become the principal shareholder in the bank after inheriting his father’s shares upon the 
elder Mateu’s death in 1935. Trias Desvalls followed suit, selling all of his shares. 
Mateu left Banc Agrícol in 1948, although he continued to serve as honorary chairman 
until 1973. His shares were purchased by Manuel Cerqueda Escalé, director of the bank 
since 1931, making Cerqueda the principal shareholder, and by Bonaventura 
Riberaygua Argelich, whose stake rose to 12 per cent. For their part Fornesa and Arnús, 
who had sold their respective stakes to Banco Español de Crédito between 1943 and 
1946, made way for Josep Coma Maestre and Xavier Sansa Nequi, who were a 
merchant and a lawyer, respectively, and who then took seats on the bank’s board of 
directors (Cabana 2005, p. 51). 
Andorra’s economic conditions during the Spanish civil war and World War II 
resulted in the emergence of new fortunes. Monetary expectations provided incentives 
to expand businesses in the country’s banking sector.  
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 At the end of 1949, Bonaventura Riberaygua Argelich, a shareholder in Banc 
Agrícol and secretary of the General Council since 1935, requested authorization to 
found a credit institution with the name Crèdit Andorrà, of which he would be the sole 
owner and his son Ramon Riberaygua Esteve would serve as managing director. The 
General Council approved his request. 12  In early 1950 Bonaventura Riberaygua 
Argelich died and his shares in Crèdit Andorrà and in Banc Agrícol, together with his 
post as secretary of the General Council, passed down to his son.13  
 Pursuant to the concessionary contract of 18 April 1929 which stipulated that 
Banc Agrícol was entitled to manage the collection of a 5 per cent tax on the operations 
of any other banks that happened to set up offices in the country, the firm lodged a 
complaint with the veguers (Andorra’s chief magistrates) that led to the suspension of 
the authorization given by the General Council to Crèdit Andorrà.14 Faced with this 
situation, the General Council then took further action in late 1950, opening an 
investigation to determine the legality of the original concession of exclusive banking 
rights made by the General Council back in 1929. In April 1951, the investigation 
concluded that the Council could not view the tax of 5 per cent on banking operations as 
irrevocable, given that ‘the powers inherent to the General Council are only those 
related to administration, never to the absolute disposition of the country’s patrimony, 
the citizens’ absolute and inalienable property’. Now it was established that the 
‘administration could rescind any agreements that were harmful to the interests over 
which it governs’15. 
 In light of these considerations, the General Council acted on 20 July 1951 to 
repeal any earlier provision on the subject of banking and went on to establish the 
requirements that had to be met by any firms wishing to enter banking or foreign 
exchange. Among the key points to underscore were the disbursement of a million 
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pesetas or the sum’s equivalent in French francs at the time of founding, and the 
requirement that all capital must belong to Andorran citizens.16 Later foreign stakes 
were restricted to a third of any company or bank’s share capital.17 This policy, which 
was strongly protectionist in nature and analogous to the regulation of limited 
companies in 1940, was motivated by a strategy aimed at infant industry protection in 
the face of international competition (Chang 2004, p. 49-133.; 2012, p. 87-98). Syndic 
Francesc Cairat and secretary Ramon Riberaygua, owner of Crèdit Andorrà, who 
thereby saw the temporary suspension of his firm’s activities lifted, signed the 
legislation. The new regulation promoted the creation of new banks, setting in motion a 
national trend in entrepreneurship that introduced competition and gave the sector its 
critical mass.   
 On 6 June 1952 Le Comptoir Andorran de Change, founded as a foreign 
exchange office by Bonaventura Mora Munt in 1938, obtained authorization from the 
General Council to become Crèdit Comercial d’Escaldes. This increased the relations 
instigated by Le Comptoir with La Societé de Banque Suisse and Le Crédit Mobilier de 
Tanger. On 12 September 1956, Crèdit Comercial d’Escaldes became Banca Mora 
under the decree of 1951.18 On 18 April 1956, Julià Reig Ribó, a tobacco manufacturer 
and owner of Tabacs Reig, received authorization from the General Council to enter 
banking19. On 21 April 1956 Banca Reig was created.20 On 13 July 1956 Josep Coma 
Maestre, a merchant mainly dedicated to the import-export business and a former board 
member of Banc Agrícol, was authorized to found Banca Coma.21 On 17 April 1957 
Josep Cassany Grau obtained permission to set up Banca Cassany22, in which Banque 
Nationale de Paris took an early stake. On 15 June 1957 the General Council authorized 
Josep Cuberes Dolsa, an industrialist, to create the Banc Immobiliari i Mercantil 
d’Andorra.23 The opening ceremony, which had a significant impact in the press, was 
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attended by leading figures in the country as well as by representatives of the Moroccan 
Real State and Commercial Bank, which gave technical support to the new firm.24 In 
September 1957 the co-princes expressly prohibited any new authorization for the 
foundation of additional banks until the profession of banker was regulated, due to the 
rise of the figure of the nominee in the country.25  
 
Table 4 
Andorra’s Banking Cluster in 1957 
 
Banks Year of establishment 
Banc Agrícol i Comercial d’Andorra 1930 
Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona 1934 
Crèdit Andorrà 1949 
Banca Mora 1956 
Banca Reig 1956 
Banca Coma 1956 
Banca Cassany 1957 
Banc Immobiliari i Mercantil 1957 
 
 Source: Own preparation 
 
Between 1947 and 1957 the resources of third parties in Andorra’s banks grew, 
on average, by 9.8 per cent annually in real terms. Despite the fact that the benefits from 
neutrality had evaporated, the banking sector expanded its critical mass throughout the 
period. The creation of new banks was sparked by opportunities to exploit the revealed 
competitive advantage arising out of the non-convertibility of European currencies. In 
particular, one of the chief factors behind the emergence of banking in Andorra was the 
distorted monetary policy of the early Franco regime (Viñas 1979, p. 268-81; Catalan 
1993, p. 121; 1995, p.117; 2003, p. 139; Serrano and Asensio 1997, p.549). One 
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downside of the Franco regime’s policy was that it encouraged capital flight amid the 
high inflation assailing Spain. It also entailed the financing of imports from abroad 
thanks to the availability of foreign currency (Cabana 2005, p. 67; Viñas 1979, p. 802). 
The destabilization of the Spanish balance of payments and the collapse of the peseta’s 
rate of exchange in the free market of Tangier from 1956 onwards produced an 
immediate effect: pesetas were transferred to Andorra to be exchanged for other 
currencies (Viñas 1979, p. 825).26 The concentration of new banks created that year, 
their ties to Tangier, and the takeoff in deposits from that date onwards support this 
view (IMF Country Report 2007, p. 9).  
The entrepreneurial bent that characterizes this period is a result of economic 
activities fostered during the critical period of the Spanish civil war and World War II. 
Wartime currency exchange, tobacco and livestock exports, and post-war trade 
generated the original accumulation that permitted the creation of Andorra’s banks. In 
order to exploit the opportunities in the environment, the new fortunes in the country 
forced competition into the sector. The profits gained from neutrality were sunk into the 
creation of a financial cluster that drew on competitive advantage from currency 
exchange. The strategy in favour of infant industry protection and the prohibition 
against granting authorization to new banks were crucial policies for the formation of a 
sector protected from foreign competition and dominated by local firms. 
  
V. The Boom, 1957-82 
 
The creation of the cluster shook up the sector and attracted foreign banks. In 1960 the 
cluster’s main institution was set up: the Association of Andorran Banks. The 
association brought all local banks together in order to institute self-regulation, defend 
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the interests of members and boost the corporate image of Andorra’s financial centre. In 
the same year, Banca Mora acquired Banca Coma. Ten years later, Banco de Bilbao 
took a stake in Banca Coma, purchasing 33.3 per cent of its shares, and the firm was 
renamed Banc Internacional. In 1973, Banc Internacional purchased Banca Mora, 
creating the Banc Internacional-Banca Mora Group. In 1967 Banco Popular Español 
acquired a stake in Crèdit Andorrà. Rafael Termes, whose ties to Crèdit Andorrà dated 
from the institution’s beginnings and who had been CEO of Banco Popular Español 
since 1966, sold his 15 per cent stake in Crèdit Andorrà to Banco Popular Español 
(Serrano 1998, p. 124). In the early nineteen-seventies, La Banque d’Indosuez bought 
another 15 per cent in the bank. The experience that foreign firms brought to these 
banks played an important part in enhancing their business capabilities and promoting 
the creation of sector leaders. 
 In this period, the cumulative annual growth rate of Andorra’s banking sector 
was, on average, 21.4 per cent in real terms. The convertibility of European’s main 
currencies in late 1958 did not erode the sector’s competitive advantage. As had 
occurred with the US dollar since 1945, convertibility was only applied to current-
account movements. Private capital transactions outside the balance of trade were 
restricted in order to avoid speculative movements that could damage the stability of 
fixed exchange rates (Eichengreen 1996, p. 163; 2007, p. 84). Because Andorra did not 
have its own currency, it remained on the regulatory fringes. The ability of Andorra’s 
banks to hold accounts in foreign currencies acted as an incentive for inflows of 
speculative capital.27 Banking secrecy and the absence of taxes meant a lack of 
cooperation with neighbouring countries. This state of affairs essentially made Andorra 
an offshore haven for foreign capital. This is the context in which devaluation of the 
peseta undertaken as part of Spain’s Stabilization Plan of 1959 precipitated Spain’s 
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nine-month closure of the border with Andorra. The argument was that Andorra 
possessed speculators who had previously been established in Tangier (Giral 1988, p. 
33). Despite measures adopted by the General Council so as not to undermine the 
currencies of neighbouring countries, the wealth of third parties held in Andorra’s banks 
that year rose by 11.5 per cent in real terms with respect to the previous year. 28  
 Andorra’s banking model, once the domestic demand for credit had been met, 
was based on attracting French francs and Spanish pesetas which were then converted 
into foreign currencies because of inflation or the risk of devaluation and put into fixed-
income securities and deposits in correspondent banks abroad. Internally, they held 
short-term positions in pesetas and francs to finance the country’s trade flows. This 
enabled them to avoid working with the Spanish or French interbank. As a consequence, 
however, the scarcity of pesetas or francs sometimes gave rise to lending in foreign 
currencies (Arasanz 1986, p. 94-102; Lluelles 1991, p. 435-40; Cabana 2005, p. 108).    
 In 1968 La Societat de Banca Andorrana (hereafter Sobanca) collapsed. Sobanca 
had been created in late 1959 when the name and shareholders of Banc Immobiliari i 
Mercantil were changed. The new owners, mainly foreign corporations represented by 
Andorran trustees, embarked on a policy of risky investments in Andorra and abroad 
(Cabana 2005, p. 93). The new shareholders included Julio Muñoz Ramonet.29 In the 
late nineteen-fifties, Muñoz had held a majority stake in Banque Genevoise de 
Commerce et Crèdit and in Schweizerische Spar- und Kreditbank - St. Gallen. Between 
1963 and 1965, after these two banks had given large loans to various companies owned 
by Muñoz, an investigation launched by the Union des Banques Régionales came to the 
conclusion that Banque Genevoise had lost half of its equity capital. In 1965 both banks 
were forced to shut their doors. To straighten out what became known as “the first 
major Swiss banking scandal”, the Union des Banques Suisses reached an agreement 
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with Muñoz to assume the assets and liabilities of the two banks in exchange for 16 
million Swiss francs and various additional safeguards. One of the safeguards involved 
Sobanca, which was being overwhelmed by events. Accordingly, Sobanca passed a 
resolution to dissolve on 15 June 1968. The collapse of the firm pushed Andorra’s 
banking sector into a tight corner, because there was no legislation governing the 
bankruptcy of a firm or its suspension of payments. In response, the Association of 
Andorran Banks, acting in conjunction with the General Council and the representatives 
of the co-princes, reached an agreement that the remaining banks would take over 
Sobanca’s obligations in order to present a sound and reassuring image of the sector. In 
return, the co-princes reiterated to the General Council their rejection of the granting of 
authorization to new banks.30   
  
Figure 2 
Spanish and French tourists visiting Andorra, 1961-89  
Source: (Bricall et al. 1975 and Lluelles 1991) 
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In the nineteen-seventies, Andorra’s banking sector consolidated its growth. 
Instability stirred up by the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary 
system in 1971, the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 and Spain’s transition to 
democracy in the wake of Franco’s death in 1975 strengthened the country’s status as a 
safe haven. The use of the peseta as an accommodative policy tool in the Spanish 
recession served as a major incentive to move Spanish capital to Andorra.  
Between 1975 and 1980, Spanish tourism in the principality grew by a factor of 
4.78 (figure 2). Over the same period, the deposits kept by third parties in Andorra’s 
banks grew by 178.2 per cent in real terms. The importance of Spanish tourism and 
capital in Andorra turned the country into the top offeror of europesetas in the world 
(Lluelles 1991, p. 439). These would have been purchased by Siaguins, a subsidiary of 
the Spanish central bank whose mission was to support the parity of the peseta abroad.31 
In 1979 the second oil price shock aggravated the European situation and sent inflation 
soaring. In the Spanish case, the excessive gradualism adopted with respect to the 
process of substitution and energy savings prolonged the effects of the oil price shock 
into the mid-eighties (Rojo 1994, p.196). High rates of inflation and the devaluation of 
the peseta in 1982 and of the franc in the early eighties once again spurred the 
movement of capital to Andorra.   
 
VI.  Maturity, 1982-2007 
 
In the nineteen-eighties, the growth of deposits in Andorra’s banks eased back 
significantly with respect to previous periods. The chief causes of this trend can be 
found in the gradual liberalization of capital controls after the collapse of Bretton 
Woods, the gradual process of European integration and the growing monetary stability 
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of Spain and France. Even so, between 1984 and 1987, 32 cases of illicit tax evasion 
flows were uncovered at the Spanish-Andorran border.32 
 In 1989 the growing need for public-sector finance led the General Council to 
lay groundwork for the regulation of the financial system, setting up the Andorran 
National Institute of Finance (whose Andorran acronym is INAF). The mission of the 
new body, the country’s leading public institution in the financial sector, was to act as a 
central bank to manage public funds and the public debt. Following the path initiated by 
the public sector, the Association of Andorran Banks signed an agreement in 1990 
relating to due diligence on the part of Andorra’s banks and savings institutions. In the 
document, the maintenance of banking secrecy was self-regulated according to the 
Basel criteria on external oversight practices. The aim was to prevent the introduction of 
capital into Andorra that was of dubious origin or for the purpose of money laundering. 
 In 1990 the entry into force of the EU directive on the free movement of capital 
posed a major challenge to the cluster’s competitive advantage.33 The directive did not 
take effect in Spain until 1993. Amid the crisis of the European Monetary System and 
speculative attacks on European currencies, Andorra’s bank deposits continued to grow 
between 1991 and 1993. From 1994, however, the totally free movement of capital in 
neighbouring countries and the falling profitability of the US dollar and the British 
pound raised doubts about the continuing viability of the model. In that year, bank 
deposits in Andorra fell by 5.15 percent in real terms with respect to 1993.  
 With the adoption of the Constitution of Andorra in 1993, the country gradually 
implemented financial regulation. Between 1993 and 2000, some fifteen laws came into 
force to define the legal personality of the Association of Andorran Banks. Legislation 
laid out the banking sector’s obligatory investment coefficients in the public debt, 
solvency ratios, liquidity, the banks’ share capital, and deposit guarantees. Regulations 
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addressed banking secrecy, disciplinary regimes, an increase in the percentage of 
foreign stakes in banks up to 51 per cent, the creation of new institutions and a common 
chart of accounts. In addition, ratification was given to the Vienna and Strasbourg 
conventions against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and against money laundering, 
respectively (Sansa 2001, p.77-251).   
 The prospect of monetary union at the turn of the century and the maturity of the 
model used to attract deposits caused the sector to change its business strategy. Ongoing 
EU monetary harmonization and the consequent reduction in arbitrage opportunities, the 
liberalization of international capital controls, the emergence of investment funds and 
the general fall in interest rates eroded the sector’s traditional competitive advantage 
and encouraged it to draw more on tax advantages and banking secrecy than on the free 
movement of currencies. Faced with this situation, Andorra’s banks followed the trend 
in neighbouring countries and took a more active role in the management of their 
resources (Sáez 2004, p. 399; IMF Country Report 2007, p. 6). Between 1995 and 2007, 
deposits lost top position to operations involving clients’ financial assets (figure 3). 
While asset management accounted for roughly 22 percent of total funds in 1995, it was 
practically equal to deposits by 1998 and by the early years of the new century, it stood 
solidly in the region of 60 per cent.  
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Figure 3 
Distribution of resources in Andorra’s banks in the period 1995-2007, by 
percentage 
Source: Own preparation based on Sáez (2004) and Department of Statistics of Andorra 
 
In the course of fifteen years, Andorra’s banking model, which had emerged 
from the historic shock of the Spanish civil war and World War II, had lost its majority 
position and turned the focus of its specialization toward wealth management and off-
balance-sheet operations. This shift also had an associated effect on the concentration of 
firms in the cluster.  
 In 1980 Banco Popular Español sold back its shareholding in Crèdit Andorrà. In 
1986 Banque d’Indosuez sold its stake in Crèdit Andorrà to La Caixa de Pensions de 
Barcelona (Lluelles 1991, p. 434). Over 1993 and 1994 La Banque Nationale de Paris 
sold its shares in Banca Cassany to La Caixa de Catalunya. As a consequence of the 
operation, Banca Cassany was renamed Banca Privada d’Andorra (hereafter BPA). In 
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been present in Andorra since 1934, signed a special agreement with the Andorran 
government to found CaixaBank, which was to acquire all of the savings bank’s assets 
in the country. In 2000 La Caixa de Catalunya sold its stake in BPA, which went on to 
have solely Andorran equity. The same year saw the foundation of Banc Sabadell 
d’Andorra, whose shares were 51 per cent owned by Banc Sabadell. Over 2000 and 
2001, Banc Agrícol i Comercial d’Andorra and Banca Reig merged, creating Andbank. 
In 2005 CaixaBank withdrew from the Andorran banking market and its assets were 
acquired by Crèdit Andorrà. Also in 2005 a tax on savings income for EU nonresidents 
in the country came into force.34 Nevertheless, two years later, BBVA and La Caixa 
disposed of their stakes in Banc Internacional-Banca Mora and Crèdit Andorrà, 
respectively, on the advice of the Spanish central bank that Spanish institutions should 
not have shareholdings in banks in countries exempt from cooperative and fiscal 
legislation.  
 Change in the banking business, concentration, increasing specialization in 
private banking and the gradual international pressure to eliminate banking secrecy and 
tax advantages drove the banking cluster to take steps to manoeuvre and adapt. The 
protection of the sector against the onslaught of international competition gave 
Andorra’s banks sufficient strength to begin a process of internationalization based on 
their know-how in wealth management. During the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, Andorra’s banking cluster began to take positions in emerging markets such as 
Latin America and in recognized financial centres like Switzerland, Luxembourg, the 
Bahamas and Panama.  
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VII. Conclusions 
 
The main contribution of this paper is the estimation of total deposits held by Andorra’s 
banks in the period 1931-2007. Until now, this was a major gap in Andorra’s economic 
literature. The estimate offers a complete picture of the development of Andorra’s banks 
in the twentieth century. The data point to four distinct phases in the lifecycle of the 
country’s financial cluster.   
The main factor in the formation of the cluster was the free movement of foreign 
currencies in Andorra owing to the fact that the country did not have its own currency. 
During the Spanish civil war and World War II, this encouraged the creation of new 
currency exchange firms that handled capital seeking safe haven in the country. Conflict 
served to provide the initial perturbation that created the conditions for the appearance 
of a cluster specializing in currency exchange. At the close of World War II, growth 
opportunities in the environment spurred the emergence of a banking cluster through an 
entrepreneurial class who had amassed wealth in wartime and would force the sector 
open in 1951. The sector, however, was not thrown open completely. A strategy to 
defend infant industry included protection of the banking sector from international 
competition. The period from 1951 to 1957 saw the creation of most of the new firms, 
which gave critical mass to the cluster.   
In 1957 Andorra’s banking sector embarked on a period of growth. The free 
movement of currencies proved to be one of its main competitive advantages. In 1958 
the convertibility of the leading currencies for business operations did not eliminate the 
possibility of transferring capital to Andorra and placing it on the international currency 
market. The country’s lack of its own currency exempted it from the regulation of the 
International Monetary System, which made current-account convertibility widespread. 
The evolution of the volume of deposits held in Andorra’s banks was strongly linked to 
! #'!
the trajectory of the exchange rate of the French franc and, especially, of the Spanish 
peseta, reflecting the political and economic situations in those countries.  
 In the mid-eighties, the growth of third-party resources decelerated in light of 
the challenge posed by the gradual liberalization of international capital and Spain’s 
entry into European Economic Community. The maturity of the business model pushed 
Andorra’s financial cluster to take a more active part in the management of its clients’ 
wealth. The early twenty-first century witnessed the consolidation of private banking as 
the sector’s core business and its cumulative know-how gave rise to a new international 
growth strategy as an adaptive response of the cluster.   
The political strategy of infant industry protection enabled the emergence of 
economies of scale. Between 1957 and 2007, the relative weight of each firm with 
respect to total deposits shows that the cluster, once formed, was dominated by two 
firms that held more than 60 per cent of all deposits. In the Andorran case, the 
advantages of geographical concentration were consolidated by the internal economies 
of leading firms that contributed to the creation of the cluster’s competitive advantage.  
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Annex 1 
The Lifecycle of Andorra’s Financial Cycle, 1930-2007 
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* BPA: Banca Privada d’Andorra. 
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* BSA: Banc Sabadell d’Andorra. 
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Footnotes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Andorra is a small landlocked country in the Pyrenees that has been governed since 1288 by two co-
princes, the Bishop of Urgell and the Count of Foix (whose role was later transferred to the President of 
France). Andorra’s first parliament was created in 1419. Known as the Consell de la Terra, it was later 
reformed and renamed the General Council. In 1993, the country approved a constitution that established 
an effective separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the context of a sovereign state 
with the two co-princes serving as joint heads of state. 
2 Andorra does not have its own currency mainly because its domestic market is small. The country’s 
limited size has fostered intense trade flows with neighbouring countries and encouraged the use of their 
currencies, which it has adopted as its own. 
3 While Klepper (1997), Maggioni (2005) and Maskell and Kebir (2005) identify three stages in the 
lifecycle of clusters, the evidence of this study points to four distinct stages, in line with Tichy (1998), 
Swann (2002), Bergman (2006) and Menzel and Fornahl (2007). For a thorough overview of the lifecycle 
of clusters, see Bergman (2008).  
4 Historically, Andorra’s economy has been based on livestock, iron ore and tobacco as part of a web of 
trade relations that privileged France and Spain. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
spread of the Industrial Revolution in Europe undermined the competitiveness of Andorra’s industrial 
activities. Faced with this state of affairs, the country undertook a policy of concessions involving its 
natural resources in order to modernize the structure of the economy. 
5 Born in Barcelona in 1898, Miquel Mateu Pla was the son of Damià Mateu Bisa and the grandson of 
Miquel Mateu Sans. Known as Mateu dels ferros for his ties to the iron and steel industry, he was a 
prominent Catalan industrialist and the co-owner of Hispano-Suiza, the carmaker and manufacturer of 
aircraft engines. He was also the principal shareholder in FHASA. Internationally, he had ties to high-
ranking French and Spanish authorities and was a friend of Alfonso XIII of Spain, Franco and the French 
president. During the Spanish civil war, he aided the Fascist side. After the war, he held the office of 
mayor of Barcelona until 1945, was the head of the Catalan employers’ association Foment del Treball 
and served as Spanish ambassador to France (Cabana 1996, p. 178-82). 
6 Decree of exclusive banking rights enacted on 18 April 1929 (AGCA). 
7 In 1927 La Caixa de Pensions de Barcelona asked the General Council for permission to open a branch !
! "$!
!
office in the country. The request was denied because the General Council had not yet settled the granting 
of exclusive banking rights. 
8 For additional information on the post-war French economy, see Sédillot (1979), Asselain (1984, 2002), 
Saint Paul (1993) and Guyomarch (1999). 
9 Minutes of the General Council from the meeting of 22 March 1938 (NAA). 
10 Minutes of the General Council of Andorra from a meeting on 22 June 1937 (NAA). 
11 Decree nº 776 of 21 December 1949 (AGCA). 
12 Decree nº 776 of 21 December 1949 (AGCA). 
13 The beginnings of Crèdit Andorrà were marked by the close relationship of the petitioner with Ferran 
Valls i Taberner, appellate judge for the Principality of Andorra between 1916 and 1942. As a result, the 
main founders of the firm included the judge’s sons Lluís and Xavier Valls-Taberner Arnó, together with 
Rafael Termes and the Andorran families the Fiters, the Casals, the Mases and the Pintats. 
14 Until 1993 the veguers, or chief magistrates, were the representatives of the co-princes in Andorra. 
15 Report on the legality of the Decree on exclusive banking rights issued on 18 April 1929 (AGCA). 
16 Banking Act of 20 July 1951 (AGCA). 
17 Regulation of Andorran limited companies enacted on 17 May 1940 (NAA). 
18 Decree nº 4209 of 12 September 1956 (AGCA). 
19 Julià Reig Ribó (Sant Julià de Lòria, 5 Dec. 1911 - 2 Jan. 1996) is one of the leading figures in 
Andorra’s political and economic life in the twentieth century. His career was focused on the 
management of the family tobacco factory, Tabacs Reig, and on the operations of Banca Reig. Politically, 
he was chosen in 1948 to sit on the General Council and served in that capacity until 1960, when he 
became general Syndic. 
20 Decree nº 4073 of 18 April 1956 (AGCA). 
21 Decree nº 4198 of 13 July 1956 (AGCA). 
22 Decree nº 153 of 17 April 1957 (AGCA). 
23 Decree nº 208 of 12 June 1957 (AGCA). 
24 “Inauguració d’un ‘banc immobiliari i mercantil’”, L’independant, 29 Aug. 1957, “En Andorra se abre 
un nuevo banco”, Diario de Barcelona, 1 Sept. 1957, “Apertura bancaria en Andorra”, El Noticiero 
Universal, 3 Sept. 1957 (NAA press clipping). !
! %&!
!
25 Letter of the chief magistrates to the General Council on 2 September 1957 (AGCA). 
26 For more information on the peseta’s rate of exchange in Tangier, see Pick (1957, p. 269). My thanks 
go to Dr. Jordi Catalan for generously alerting me to this source. 
27 The most common foreign currencies used when opening an account in the principality, according to 
information provided by professionals in the sector, were the US dollar, the British pound, the German 
mark, the Swiss franc and the Swedish krona. Sogues (1975, p. 322) estimates that the relative weight of 
foreign currency balances in Andorra in 1975 exceeded 65%. Arasanz (1986, p. 95) notes that by 1982 
foreign currency balances in the main Andorran banks were in the region of 80%. 
28 Notice of 21 April 1959 establishing that: 1. Payment for goods not intended for import were 
forbidden; 2. Opening bank accounts for non-residents was forbidden; 3. Shareholders and shares in 
banks had to be submitted formally in writing, and 4. Inspectors were appointed by the General Council 
(Fiter 1973, p.442). 
29 Julio Muñoz Ramonet (Barcelona, 1912 – St. Gallen, 1991) was a leading cotton businessman in the 
Spanish post-war period. Thanks to his contacts with the Franco regime, he was able to secure cotton 
import licenses that enabled him to amass a large fortune. In 1946 he married Carmen Villalonga, who 
was the daughter of Ignacio Villalonga, chairman of the Banco Central Español. He diversified his 
business holdings, becoming the owner of Barcelona’s El Águila Mall, the city’s Ritz Hotel, property 
development companies, the insurer La Compañía Internacional de Seguros and two Swiss banks: Banque 
Genevoise de Commerce et Crèdit and Schweizerische Spar- und Kreditbank - St. Gallen, both of which 
collapsed in 1965. The insurance company also collapsed, exposing a series of irregularities that forced 
Muñoz into exile in Switzerland in order to avoid being incarcerated in Spain (Cabana 1996, p.186-90). 
30 Letter of the chief magistrates to the General Council on 17 November 1970, record number 1256-se 
(AGCA). 
31 Siaguins dates back to an office set up by the Spanish central bank in the nineteen-forties in Rue des 
Siaghins in Tangier. The aim of the office was to intervene in the black market for pesetas. With the 
peseta’s foreign convertibility in 1959, the Sociedad Siaguins was created as a subsidiary of the Spanish 
central bank and the Tangier office moved to Zurich. The objectives of the subsidiary were to sell pesetas 
to anyone requesting them, thereby avoiding scarcity and pushing the exchange rate higher, and to buy 
any pesetas offered on the international market asking no questions about their place of origin, thereby !
! %'!
!
ensuring that any excess of pesetas would not put downward pressure on the currency’s exchange rate. In 
the early eighties, this mission devolved to the Banco Exterior de España in Switzerland (Martinez, J. A. 
“El Banco de España delega en el Banco Exterior en Suiza la compra-venta de pesetas en el mercado 
internacional” El País, 22 Aug. 1982). 
32 Reixach. J, “Andorra S.A.”, Diari de Barcelona, 26 Dec. 1987, cited by Lluelles (1991, p. 435). 
33 Directive 88/361/EEC of the European Economic Community. 
34 Council Directive 2003/48/EC.  
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